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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the dependency of firm specific factors 
and credit rating on capital structure of small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
Balkans' listed companies, during the period 2006-2011. Panel data analysis is 
employed and the results indicate that size, asset tangibility, profitability, liquidity, 
age and growth opportunities are dominant determinants of capital structure of 
Balkan listed SMEs. A noteworthy point is the importance of firm specific parameters 
in the post-crisis period. Furthermore the results indicate that the capital structure 
of firms in the Balkan area is related to credit rating strength. Finally, we notice that 
separate country models provided different results from the generic approach. This 
is attributed to country idiosyncratic effects. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the most important determinants of capital structure in small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Balkans. There is an adequate body of prior 
studies that proves SMEs as a fundamental factor of macroeconomic growth. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed that under perfect capital markets the firms 
value is unaffected by its capital structure. This seminal work was a pioneer in the 
area of capital structure, since then many empirical researches have taken place but 
none could indicate the ideal combination of debt and equity. It is still a 
controversial issue both for academics and managers. It should be noted that the 
imperfections faced in the real world, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, 
agency conflicts, market frictions and taxation, pose difficulties on firms' outsource 
financing,Vermoesen et al. (2012).  
In this study we investigate the effect of firm specific factors in the capital structure 
choices of SMEs in Balkans. Also we attempt to tackle whether there are substantial 
differences on capital structure determinants among the Balkan countries. The 
approach followed to address the above topics, is panel data analysis to a sample of 
eight Balkan countries - Greece, Bulgaria, Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, FYROM, 
Romania, Croatia and Slovenia- for the period 2006-2011. A crucial point of our 
investigation is the global financial distress on which we attempt to give an insight. 
Prior studies, concentrated on understanding the firm specific determinants of 
capital structure, concluded that the pecking order and the trade-off theory are the 
two theories in opposition to justify the heterogeneous effect of each firm factor on 
capital structure. Additionally, the literature has focused either on the capital 
structure determinants of the SMEs of a single country (Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos, 
2013, Degryse et al., 2010, Michaelas et al., 1999, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, 
Sogorb-Mira, 2005, Vermoesen et al., 2012, Wijst and Thurik, 1993) or on cross-
country comparisons of capital structure determinants in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Delcoure, 2007, Mateev et al., 2013), and Central and Western Europe Hall et al. 
(2004).  
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In the capital structure theory there is a question of vital importance whether the 
driving force of the corporate financing decisions relate to firm specific or country 
specific parameters(Hall et al., 2004, Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
Firms' size, asset tangibility, profitability, growth opportunities and years in 
operation are variables commonly employed in prior literature to present the 
relationship with all proxies of debt (Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Degryse et 
al., 2010, Hall et al., 2004, Michaelas et al., 1999, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, Psillaki 
and Daskalakis, 2009). In our case we incorporate liquidity as well, a determinant 
taken into consideration only by Mateev et al. (2013). Moreover, we extend the 
investigation by taking into account credit rating strength, a factor that has been 
systematically neglected in prior studies. Only Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos (2013) 
examines the interaction of creditworthiness. Comparisons among countries in 
relation to SMEs’ capital structure determinants are not common in prior literature. 
The only studies that focus on this issue are those of Hall et al. (2004) who 
investigate the capital structure of SMEs in eight European countries,Mateev et al. 
(2013) who respectively do so in seven Central East European Countries and Psillaki 
and Daskalakis (2009) who compare Greek and French SMEs.Hall et al. (2004) and 
Mateev et al. (2013) report cross-country differences in SME capital structure 
arguing that these differences are caused of the firm rather than the country specific 
effects.Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) findings approve that firm specific factors are 
responsible for the differences in the capital structure determinants of SMEs for 
France and Greece.  
The aim of this study is to extend the previous research on firm specific 
determinants in capital structure choices of SMEs. More specifically, we include firm 
factors, credit rating and country factors in order to determine on the basic factors 
of capital structure in the Balkan area. Also, we test whether global financial distress 
affected capital structure. It is important to mention that there is no similar study 
that follows the aforementioned criteria in order to examine capital structure 
(Balkans, liquidity proxy, credit rating strength, financial crisis effect). 
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We expect that the findings of this study will be a useful tool in the hands of firm 
managers in Balkans. The balance between debt and equity in a company, under the 
global financial distress we are facing, is the key element for a successful manager. 
Also policy makers might be interested in our study for improving business 
environment through investment and growth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the different capital 
structure theories and provides the link from theory to the empirical hypotheses 
used in this study. Section 3 describes the definition of variables, the data used, and 
the econometric model employed. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and 
presents a cross-country analysis. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), claim that the capital structure of a firm does not affect 
its value. In the vast stream of literature subsequent to that statement has not been 
approved. Though, we do not have persuasive explanations on what determines the 
choice of the capital structure in the current financial environment. There are two 
predominant theories that examine the capital structure choices on SME’s. These are 
the trade-off theory (TOT) and the pecking order theory (POT).  
According to the trade-off theory, firms choose their optimal level of debt by setting 
in balance the profits they enjoy and costs they confront from an additional unit of 
debt. The advantages related to debt are the tax benefits of interest payments and 
the shrinkage of agency problems between shareholders and managers related to 
the free cash flows. On the other hand, debt is linked to higher interest rates, which 
raise the agency cost between the owners and the financial creditors and bankruptcy 
costs, which may take place in high levels of debt (Degryse et al., 2010, Palacín-
Sánchez et al., 2012)  
The pecking order theory that is proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and claims 
that there is no optimal capital structure for a firm. In addition, it postulates that a 
firm is less likely to use external funds to raise capital due to asymmetric information 
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problems between managers and investors. The main idea is the prioritization of 
financing sources. Firms prefer firstly to use their internal sources like retained 
earnings secondly the use of debt and their last option is to raise equity. These are 
verified in the studies of (Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Degryse et al., 2010, 
Mateev et al., 2013). 
 We concentrate on the firm specific determinants of leverage as well as their 
relation to both capital structure theories. These factors are size, asset tangibility, 
profitability, growth opportunities, liquidity, age and credit rating. We summarize 
the predictions in Table 1 and we structure a series of hypotheses based on the 
aforementioned factors and debt maturity. 
 Trade-off theory Pecking order theory 
Firm Characteristics 
  Firm Size + + 
  Asset Tangibility + + 
  Profitability + - 
  Growth Opportunities - + 
  Age + - 
  Liquidity ? ? 
  Credit Rating Strength ? ? 
Table 1 Capital structure theory and expected sign on leverage for independent variables 
2.2 Firm Characteristics 
2.2.1 Firm Size and Debt 
One of the variables that have been traditionally considered in the capital structure 
choices is size. Both the trade-off and pecking order theory have taken size as a basic 
determinant. Rajan and Zingales (1995) conclude that size should be considered as 
an inverse indicator of possible financial distress. Fama and French (2002) conclude 
that size can also be an inverse indicator of cash flow volatility. Based on the above 
conclusions we could argue that the bigger the size of the firm the more likely it is for 
the firm to be diversified and its flows less volatile. Therefore, the trade-off theory 
anticipates a positive relationship between size and the company's leverage. 
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Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that size brings to the surface any 
asymmetric information problems between managers and external investors. As a 
result, the larger a company the more transparent it is, due to robust and reliable 
information it provides to the external investors. According to the pecking order 
theory, a firm's size will make easier the access to credit and it can decrease the cost 
of other funding sources. This dependency has been tested with positive results in 
various studies in the area of SME's; we emphasize on those of (Degryse et al., 2010, 
Fama and French, 2002, Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013) 
Taking into consideration the debt maturity, the dependency between firm size and 
its debt level proves to alter. As Bevan and Danbolt (2004) state, smaller companies 
are more likely to have asymmetric information problems and carry more risk. This is 
a barrier to long-term debt financing and their only option is that of short-term debt. 
Also, it is worth mentioning that when companies grow, they change their debt 
profile from short-term debt to long-term debt. The results above are shown in the 
studies of (Hall et al., 2004, Michaelas et al., 1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Prior 
literature review leads us to form our first set of hypotheses as follows: 
 H1a. Total debt (DR) is positively related to firm size (LNSA), 
 H1b. Long-term debt (LDR) is positively related to firm size (LNSA) and 
 H1c. Short-term debt (SDR) relates negatively to firm size (LNSA). 
2.2.2 Asset Tangibility and Debt 
Asset tangibility is an important determinant of the capital structure. Tangible assets 
are related to debt because they are treated as collateral in cases of loan 
applications. Banks avoid financing firms that are unable to provide collateral. In case 
of a firm’s default financial institutions should have the ability to recover the initial 
capital by liquidating the collateralized tangible assets. In addition, collateral 
decrease bankruptcy costs and credit risk. Considering the above, the trade-off 
theory predicts a positive dependency between asset tangibility and leverage. 
Furthermore, based on Degryse et al. (2010), the pecking order theory assumes a 
positive relationship between asset tangibility and debt; the existence of collateral 
reduces any asymmetric information problems. Prior studies of (Bevan and Danbolt, 
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2004, Degryse et al., 2010, Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013, Michaelas et al., 
1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) verify this positive relationship between tangible assets 
and debt, and only Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) report a negative relationship. 
However, asset tangibility relates differently to short-term and long-term debt. This 
may occur because fixed assets are commonly used to guarantee long-term loans, 
while for short-term lending current assets are used. The results of (Degryse et al., 
2010, Hall et al., 2004, Sogorb-Mira, 2005, Wijst and Thurik, 1993) demonstrate 
these relationships. Consequently, our second set of hypotheses is formulated as 
follows: 
 H2a. Total debt (DR) is positively related to asset tangibility (TANG),  
 H2b. Long-term debt (LDR) is positively related to asset tangibility (TANG) and 
 H2c. Short-term debt (SDR) relates negatively to asset tangibility (TANG). 
2.2.3 Profitability and Debt 
Capital structure is also affected by profitability. The pecking order theory expects a 
negative effect on debt by an increase in profits. According to the pecking order 
theory, profitable firms use firstly as a source of finance the retained earnings and 
then, if necessary, external financing. On the other hand, profitability can also have a 
positive effect on debt. Based on the trade-off theory while firms' profits raise, they 
are able to save more in taxes related to debt. In addition, they will have smaller 
probability of default which could allow them to borrow more capital. Even though 
there are discrepancies on the predictions, the outcome of the studies of (Cassar and 
Holmes, 2003, Degryse et al., 2010, Sogorb-Mira, 2005, Wijst and Thurik, 1993) 
verified the negative effect of profits on debt. 
Moreover, Michaelas et al. (1999)  indicated a different effect on profits to short-
term and long-term debt.  They found that profitability has a greater impact on long-
term debt than short-term. Small firms are more likely to choose as a source of 
finance a short-term loan than a long-term. Usually, if there are excessive internal 
funds they use it to reduce the long-term loan. Besides that the short-term loans can 
be easily paid off and have higher interest rates. This declares a preference to short-
term loans which is verified by (Cassar and Holmes, 2003, Degryse et al., 2010, 
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Sogorb-Mira, 2005, Wijst and Thurik, 1993). It is necessary to mention that in our 
study we are going to use as indicators of profitability the ROA ratio. So we expect a 
negative effect on debt by this ratio. Then, we can state our hypothesis as following.  
 H3a. Total debt (DR) is negatively related to profitability (ROA) 
 H3b. Long-term debt (LDR) is negatively related to profitability (ROA) and 
 H3c. Short-term debt (SDR) is negatively related to profitability (ROA).  
2.2.4 Growth Opportunities and Debt 
When it comes to the effect of growth opportunities on debt in SMEs based on debt 
maturity differentiation, pertinent literature provides different perspectives that 
lead to mixed results.  
Growth opportunities will possibly put a strain on retained earnings and push the 
firm into borrowing. However, as Myers (1977) has argued, growth opportunities can 
produce moral hazard situations and give incentive to small firms to undertake risks 
in order to grow. The benefits of these growth opportunities, if realized, will not be 
employed by lenders, who will only recover the amount of their loans, resulting in a 
clear agency problem, which will be reflected in increased costs of long-term debt. In 
simple words the trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. The studies of (Fama and French, 2002, Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995, Titman and Wessels, 1988) verify this negative relationship. Though, 
according to Myers (1977), excessive use of short-term debt overcomes the 
aforementioned problem and therefore short- term leverage is positively affected by 
growth opportunities. On the other hand, according to the pecking order theory, a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and all types of debt is expected. 
This relationship may, however, be more relevant with short-term debt. This is due 
to firms that grow being more likely to use up their internal resources and be obliged 
to resort to external finance, preferably debt. Empirical evidence in SMEs has 
verified this positive relationship in a majority of cases (e.g.(Degryse et al., 2010, 
Mateev et al., 2013, Michaelas et al., 1999, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, Sogorb-
Mira, 2005). Taking into consideration all the above we set the third set of 
hypotheses: 
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 H4a. Total debt (DR) is positively related to growth opportunities (INTA)1, 
 H4b. Long-term debt (LDR) is negatively related to growth opportunities 
(INTA) and 
 H4c. Short-term debt (SDR) relates positively to growth opportunities (INTA). 
2.2.5 Liquidity and Debt 
Liquidity is another important determinant of capital structure that is not 
encountered in many previous studies. Small firms usually have a higher proportion 
of current liabilities in their capital structure compared to large firms. According to 
Mateev et al. (2013), a firm’s capability to sustain short-term liquidity is expected to 
be positively related to its growth. Thus, firms with more growth opportunities will 
keep higher liquidity levels and thus will face less severe financing constraints. These 
firms will employ lower (short-term) leverage ratios. As a result, we state the 
following set of hypotheses: 
 H5a. Total debt (DR) is positively related to firm liquidity (CF)2, 
 H5b. Long-term debt (LDR) is negatively related to firm liquidity (CF), and 
 H5c. Short-term debt (SDR) is positively related to firm liquidity (CF). 
2.2.6 Age and Debt 
With regard to age, according to the pecking order theory, the greater the age of a 
firm, the more capable to self-generate resources and the less the need to resort to 
external financing. On the other hand, firms that are few years in operation will find 
themselves obliged to use debt in order to face their inability to accumulate 
resources retained in their first years of their life. This relation has been verified in 
works such as those of (Hall et al., 2004, Jordan et al., 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999). 
Consequently, the relationship of age with all types of debt is likely to be negative 
and the hypotheses related to this factor can be stated as follows: 
 H6a. Total debt (DR) is negatively related to age (AGE), 
 H6b. Long-term debt (LDR) is negatively related to and age (AGE) and 
 H6c. Short-term debt (SDR) is negatively related to age (AGE). 
                                                          
1
 The Majority of previous literature (e.g., Myers 1977; Michaelas et al. 1999) states that SMEs, mainly 
use short-term financing. As a result, total leverage mainly consists of short-term debt. 
2
 We use the same sub-hypothesis used in the first footnote. 
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2.2.7 Credit Rating Strength and Debt 
Credit rating strength is the last factor we test in order to test whether it affects 
capital structure. There are no many studies modeling credit rating strength. Noulas 
and Genimakis (2011) use credit ratings in order to interpret capital structure 
behavior for a sample of Greek listed firms. The authors employ data on credit 
scorings from a Greek operating company (ICAP) and for a different examination 
period. Instead, in our case we employ an up-to-date dataset from an internationally 
recognized database (Amadeus) and we cover both the pre- and post-crisis period 
for SMEs in the Balkans. Firms with low creditworthiness are supposed to encounter 
difficulties to access debt markets and even when this is possible it is not viable as 
far as they experience high debt costs. On the other hand, firms with high credit 
strength are expected to have easy access to credit and enjoy a low cost of debt. 
Therefore, our last set of hypotheses would suggest the following relationship 
between credit rating strength and various types of leverage: 
 H7a. Total debt (DR) is positively related to credit rating strength 
(DUMMY_CR), 
 H7b. Long-term debt (LDR) is positively related to credit rating strength 
(DUMMY_CR) and 
 H7c. Short-term debt (SDR) is positively related to credit rating strength 
(DUMMY_CR). 
In contrast with the majority of prior studies that deal with privately held SME’s, we 
follow the example of Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos (2013) and employ data from 
listed firms. The major advantage of listed compared to non-listed companies is the 
fact that they can easily access both debt and equity markets without any 
constraints. 
 Determinants of the Capital  
Structure of SME’s in Balkans 
 
15 | P a g e  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Dataset and Variables 
In this study we adopt the European Commission’s SME definition (2003)3. According 
to this definition, SMEs are defined as enterprises in the non-financial sector that 
employ less than 250 persons, whose annual turnover does not exceed €50 million 
and whose annual balance sheet total does not exceed €43 million4. Based on the 
three aforementioned criteria (number of employees, annual turnover and balance 
sheet total), SMEs are categorized in 3 size classes: micro enterprises, small 
enterprises and medium sized enterprises. Following the methodology of (Dasilas  
and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2009, Vermoesen et al., 2012) 
we exclude micro enterprises from our sample. Micro enterprises employ less than 
ten people and have turnover or balance sheet total less than €2 million. 
The sample of our SMEs has been collected from AMADEUS database5 and includes 
455 companies from the Balkans for the period 2006–2012. It should be mentioned 
that for the purpose of our analysis, we remove from the dataset those firms for 
which there are less than six consecutive years of accounting data and without a full 
record for each variable over the period of examination. We end up with a final 
sample of 359 SMEs (2,154 year observations) for the period from 2006 to 2012. 
Table2 and Figure1 present the distribution of the 359 SMEs in Balkan counties. It 
should be noted that our sample excludes two Balkan countries, Albania and FYROM 
due to data unavailability. One hundred and sixty two firms (162) are from Republic 
of Serbia (45.13%); 76 from Romania (21.17%); 48 from Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(13.37%); 26 from Croatia (7.24%), 21 from Bulgaria (5.85%), 16 from Greece 
(4.46%), 7 from Slovenia (1.95%) and three from Montenegro (0.84%). The largest 
number of SMEs in our sample is from Republic of Serbia, followed by Romania and 
                                                          
3
  Bhaird and Lucey (2010), Mateev et al. (2013) and Dasillas and Papasyriopoulos (2013) have also 
adopted the European Commission’s definition for identifying SMEs. 
4
 This definition is mostly used for statistical reasons. In the European definition of SMEs three 
additional criteria are added: the economic unit to be more or less autonomous, annual turnover to 
be less than EUR 50 million, and/or balance sheet total to be less than EUR 43 million (Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC). 
5
 For more details see http://www.bvdep.com/en/AMADEUS.html. The AMADEUS database allows us 
to choose among a huge variety of public and private companies in 43 European countries. For the 
scope of our research we selected only small and medium-sized companies from the Balkans. 
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Bosnia & Herzegovina. Firms based on these countries consist of almost 80% of our 
sample. The rest countries have substantially lower weights compared to the three 
dominant countries. Finally, we should note that separate analysis of the firms based 
on Montenegro, Slovenia and Greece is meaningless as far as the small sample could 
lead to misleading results. 
[Insert Table2 about here] 
[Insert Figure1 about here] 
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
In the second part of our work we formulated some hypotheses in order to test 
whether the capital structure of SMEs in the Balkans is better explained by the trade-
off or the pecking order theory. According to previous studies the dependent 
variable is debt capital structure. Following (Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, 
Michaelas et al., 1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) the most commonly used capital 
structure proxy is the total debt ratio (DR) which is defined as the ratio of debt to 
total assets. However, as argued by (Chittenden et al., 1996, Degryse et al., 2010, 
Mateev et al., 2013, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, Wijst and Thurik, 1993), any 
analysis of leverage determinants based only on total debt may screen the important 
differences between long-term and short-term debt. As a result, we have two 
additional capital structure proxies, long-term debt (LDR) and short-term debt (SDR) 
that are calculated as long-term debt to total assets and short-term debt to total 
assets, respectively. 
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Regarding explanatory variables, we have selected several proxies commonly used in 
the pertinent literature. The first firm specific determinant of capital structure that 
we employ is firm size (LNSA). Based on (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004, Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009, Rajan and Zingales, 1995) we 
measure firm size as the logarithm of sales. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the second 
firm factor. Following (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004, Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, 
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Mateev et al., 2013, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009, Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) Asset Tangibility is the ratio of tangible to 
total assets. The third firm factor is profitability (ROA). According to (Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Degryse et al., 2010, Mateev et al., 2013, Palacín-Sánchez et 
al., 2012, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) is defined as the ratio between Net Income and total 
assets. We also consider the effect of growth opportunities (INTA) on capital 
structure. (Mateev et al., 2013, Michaelas et al., 1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005), define 
growth opportunities as the ratio between intangible assets and total assets. The 
next variable employed is liquidity (CF_RATIO) which is computed as the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities based on Mateev et al. (2013). Finally, we 
consider the effect of age (AGE) on capital structure and following(Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Hall et al., 2004, Michaelas et al., 1999, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 
2012) age is defined as the logarithm of number of years of business operation. 
Following the credit rating system of AMADEUS and based on (Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos, 2013) methodology, we distinguish the companies of our sample in 
four groups according to their credit strength (DUMMY_CR): “Healthy” companies, 
“Balanced” companies, “Vulnerable” companies and “Risky” companies. The first 
group of firms enjoys ratings between A and AAA. In this group, companies included 
are capable of meeting their financial obligations and their creditworthiness and 
solvency are high. The second group of companies is awarded ratings between BB 
and BBB. In this group, firms’ capital structure and economic equilibrium are 
considered adequate. Though, companies could face some ongoing uncertainties or 
exposure to adverse business and economic conditions. The third group of firms 
receives ratings between CCC and B. In this group, companies display vulnerable 
signals with regard to the economic fundamentals, adverse market events and 
inadequate management. The forth group of firms contains ratings between D and 
CC. In this group, companies display high vulnerability, a low capacity to meet 
financial commitments and high probability of insolvency. We cardinalize these 
credit ratings, employing a 4-point scale: 1 for “Healthy” firms, 2 for “Balanced”, 3 
for “Vulnerable” firms and 4 for “Risky” firms. 
 Determinants of the Capital  
Structure of SME’s in Balkans 
 
18 | P a g e  
 
Table3, Table4 and Table5 provide descriptive statistics for the full sample of firms 
and during the pre and post-crisis period for the three leverage proxies, the firm 
factors and the credit ratings. These Tables display an increase in all debt proxies, 
total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt during the crisis period. Regarding 
firm factors, the majority of them do not present great deviations between the two 
different time periods. Profitability, expressed by ROA variable proves to deteriorate 
in the post-crisis period, which seems reasonable. As far as credit strength is 
concerned, expressed by DUMMY_CR, fares better in the post-crisis period from 
(2.25) to (2.38) which is unrelated with the performance of the debt figures, the 
evidence of prior studies and the common financial sense.  
It should be noted that we make a generic approach by analyzing the whole dataset. 
Then, we employ separate models, following the same econometric methodology, 
for the countries that have an amount of SMEs that is noteworthy to be taken into 
consideration. 
[Insert Table3, Table4 and Table5 about here] 
The correlation matrix of variables, Table6, gives an insight of the correlations of the 
variables taken into consideration in our analysis. Our observations are consistent 
with prior studies as far as there is strong correlation between short-term debt and 
total debt, and moderate correlation between long-term debt and total debt. 
Additionally, asset tangibility is positively correlated with long-term debt confirming 
that tangible assets are collateralized for long-term debt raising purposes. Moreover, 
credit ratings have a positive sign, which is interpreted as high creditworthiness 
implies higher debt levels. Finally, correlations between explanatory variables are 
low, proving that we do not face the multicollinearity problem in our analysis. 
[Insert Table6 about here] 
3.3 Model Specification 
In our econometric analysis we employ the panel data methodology. Our dataset 
contains a number of cross-sectional units and is applied over six years 
simultaneously. Panel models provide superior estimates compared to the cross-
sectional models employed in the most previous capital structure studies Psillaki and 
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Daskalakis (2009). Panel data analysis is also applied by Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos 
(2013) as well. There are many benefits of panel data analysis compared to other 
approaches. Firstly, models using panel data are less likely to suffer from 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and obviously they provide better 
econometric estimates. Secondly, panel data models control for the presence of firm 
specific effects on regression analysis. Finally, panel data can better detect and 
measure effects that simply cannot be observed in pure cross-section or pure time-
series data. 
Following several capital structure studies such as (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004, Dasilas  
and Papaysiopoulos, 2013, Degryse et al., 2010, Mateev et al., 2013, Michaelas et al., 
1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) we use fixed-effects panel data model which controls for 
all time-invariant differences among sample firms6. The resulting models are: 
 
DRi,t = β0 + β1TANGi,t + β2LNSAi,t + β3AGEi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFi,t + β6INTAi,t + 
β7DUMMY_CRi,t+β8CRISIS*TANGi,t + β9CRISIS*LNSAi,t + β10CRISIS*AGEi,t  + 
β11CRISIS*ROAi,t +  +β12CRISIS*CFi,t + β13CRISIS*INTAi,t +  β14CRISIS* DUMMY_CRi,t  
+εi,t 
 
LDRi,t = β0 + β1TANGi,t + β2LNSAi,t + β3AGEi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFi,t + β6INTAi,t + 
β7DUMMY_CRi,t+β8CRISIS*TANGi,t + β9CRISIS*LNSAi,t + β10CRISIS*AGEi,t  + 
β11CRISIS*ROAi,t +  +β12CRISIS*CFi,t + β13CRISIS*INTAi,t +  β14CRISIS* DUMMY_CRi,t  
+εi,t 
 
SDRi,t = β0 + β1TANGi,t + β2LNSAi,t + β3AGEi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFi,t + β6INTAi,t + 
β7DUMMY_CRi,t+β8CRISIS*TANGi,t + β9CRISIS*LNSAi,t + β10CRISIS*AGEi,t  + 
β11CRISIS*ROAi,t +  +β12CRISIS*CFi,t + β13CRISIS*INTAi,t +  β14CRISIS* DUMMY_CRi,t  
+εi,t 
I=1,…….,N  t=1,…….N 
                                                          
6
 The Hausman test is employed to check for the fixed-effects or random-effects model. 
 Determinants of the Capital  
Structure of SME’s in Balkans 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
i denotes SMEs ranging from 1 to 359 and t denotes years from 1 to 6. In the above 
models we use a crisis dummy (DUMMY_CR) that takes the value of 0 in the post-
crisis period (2009-2012) and 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008). The crisis 
dummy is interacted with all control variables to test for differences between these 
two eras and find the effects of financial distress. 
4. Empirical Results 
The purpose of this section is to shed light on the questions posed in our 
Introduction. Firstly we discuss the results on the firm characteristics as potential 
drivers of capital structure and then we check whether there are country specific 
effects. Also, we analyze the results of the models used to test the hypotheses we 
formulated in the second section. Tables 7-12 present the results of the regression 
analysis for our dependent variables, total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt. 
4.1 Capital structure determinants of SMEs in Balkans during 
global financial distress 
In this first part we discuss the results on the firm characteristics, by using the total 
sample which pools firms from the whole Balkan region. Table7, the generic 
regression Outputs Table, indicates the results of the regressions and how 
independent variables affect our three leverage proxies.  
[Insert Table7 about here] 
4.1.1 Firm Size and Debt 
The observed variable LNSA, which is the size of the firm, indicates a positive 
dependency in the regression of total debt and short-term debt, and a negative 
dependency in the regression of long-term debt. Based on the TOT and POT theories, 
which predict a positive relationship between size and total debt, we are consistent. 
Moreover, the coefficient of size is positive and statistically significant in the 
regression of total debt, which is in line with previous studies of (Degryse et al., 
2010, Hall et al., 2004, Michaelas et al., 1999, Wijst and Thurik, 1993). The coefficient 
of the size is positive and statistically significant with the regression of short-term 
debt in line with  previous studies of (Degryse et al., 2010, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 
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2012, Sogorb-Mira, 2005). As far as the regression of long-term debt is concerned, 
there is a negative dependency with the coefficient of size and it is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level. The results of our regressions confirm the 
hypothesis H1a and confront the hypothesis H1c; we cannot do any commenting on 
H1b as far we do not display statistically significant results. A probable explanation 
for the rejection of H1c, could be the high correlation coefficient between total debt 
and short-term debt which is 0,81, Table6. Taking into account this correlation 
coefficient it is reasonable to have an inverse sign, from the expected one, for short-
term debt. 
4.1.2 Asset Tangibility and Debt 
The coefficient of asset tangibility (TANG) is statistically significant for all proxies of 
leverage. Moreover, asset tangibility is negatively related to total debt and short-
term debt and positively related to long-term debt. This finding is not consistent with 
the pecking order theory or with the trade-off theory, which indicate a positive 
relationship in the case of total debt. Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) stated that asset 
tangibility is related with an inverse sign to long and short-term leverage, positive for 
long-term debt and negative for short-term debt. In other words, a part of tangible 
assets is taken as collateral for long-term loans, while in short-term loans the 
existence of guarantees is not a necessity Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos (2013). Our 
results in long-term debt regression and in short-term debt regression are in line 
with many studies such as those of (Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013, Palacín-
Sánchez et al., 2012). As far as total debt regression  is concerned, Psillaki and 
Daskalakis (2009) found a negative relationship between asset tangibility and total 
debt. Firms that have a small portion of tangible assets desire to borrow funds 
because they undertake less risk in the case of default. On the other hand, firms with 
high percentage of tangible assets do not consider borrowing. The rational is that 
these firms have found a financing stream of return which gives them the necessary 
funds and prevents them from outsourcing capital. Based on the above, we reject 
the H2a hypothesis and we accept H2b and H2c. 
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4.1.3 Profitability and Debt 
Our pooled OLS results reveal a positive and non-significant relationship between 
profitability (ROA) and total debt, a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with short-term debt and negative and statistically significant relationship with long-
term debt. Our results are not consistent with any of the two theories, besides the 
fact that we have a positive coefficient of profitability in the regression results for 
total debt. The trade-off theory expects a positive sign, but in our case the 
coefficient is insignificant. The negative and significant coefficient of profitability in 
the long-term debt regression is consistent with the studies of (Bevan and Danbolt, 
2004, Mateev et al., 2013). In addition, the positive and significant coefficient of 
profitability in the short-term debt regression follows the study of Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos (2013). Based on our hypothesis we accept the H3b. Moreover, firms 
that earn profits are more likely to choose a short-term loan than a long-term one as 
a source of financing. Usually if there are excessive internal funds, they are used in 
order to reduce the long-term loan besides the fact that the short-term loans can be 
easily paid off and have higher interest rates. Finally, according to the data 
presented we see a positive relationship between short-term debt and profitability. 
As a result, we reject H3c which confronts our initial hypothesis.  
4.1.4  Growth Opportunities and Debt 
Growth opportunities (INTA), as measured by intangible assets, have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on all three debt measures. Consequently, the 
relationship of total debt with the growth opportunities variable is not consistent 
with the agency theory of Myers (1977). However the pecking order theory is 
supported by the results for growth opportunities. Additionally, our results are in 
line with a considerable number of prior studies, (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004, 
Chittenden et al., 1996, Degryse et al., 2010, Jong, 1999, Michaelas et al., 1999, 
Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012, Sogorb-Mira, 2005) for total debt and long-term debt 
and (Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013) for short-term debt. However, it should be 
mentioned that the positive coefficient of growth opportunities in the long-term 
debt model is opposite to what we have predicted in the second section. To 
summarize, we accept H4a and H4c and we reject H4b. It is important to mention 
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that the debt increases to finance growth are greater in the short-term (0,543) 
compared to the long-term (0,300). Finally, it is important to note that in our dataset 
many firms do not have intangible assets on their balance sheets, Table3.  
4.1.5 Liquidity and Debt 
Looking at the role of CF, we derive statistically significant results. The regression 
analysis shows that there is negative relationship between the liquidity variable and 
both total debt and short-term debt. On the other hand, CF is positively related to 
long-term debt. The results are at odds with Mateev et al. (2013)7. In fact, they are 
exactly the opposite and as a result our set of hypotheses is fully rejected. According 
to these results, the more liquid a firm is the long-term debt financing increases. The 
conclusions for short-term debt and total debt are the opposite. As far as there is no 
further literature employing liquidity parameter to test for capital structure, we 
cannot easily interpret these controversial results.  
4.1.6 Age and Debt 
Regarding the years of operation, we find that our results are completely different 
from those expected. In specific, we expect a negative relationship of age (AGE) with 
all leverage proxies. According to prior literature Palacín-Sánchez et al. (2012), the 
older a SME, the lower its leverage levels, because of the increase in its capacity to 
generate resources. Also many years in operation increase the financial 
trustworthiness of a company and makes easier equity financing. The regressions 
results, however, give positive relationships. As far as total debt is concerned, the 
results support the trade-off theory predictions and consistent with prior literature, 
for example, (Chittenden et al., 1996, Hall et al., 2004, Jordan et al., 1998, mac an 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2009, Michaelas et al., 1999). The results for long-term debt are 
similar to those of Dasilas  and Papaysiopoulos (2013) . It is important to note that 
the positive relationships between age and the total debt and between age and 
short-term debt are not statistically significant. Obviously, statistical insignificance 
does not allow us to make safe conclusions for these two proxies. The coefficient of 
                                                          
7
 One possible explanation for the opposite results could be the fact that Mateev et al. (2013) employ 
a completely different approach to make their econometric analysis (GMM-system estimator). 
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the age variable is statistical significant only for the long-term debt at the 5% level. 
Contrary to our expectations, age is positively related to long-term debt. This result 
is reasonable in the sense that better-established firms have necessary assets to 
offer as collateral to ensure long-term debt compared to younger that have fewer 
assets to collateralize. Therefore, we reject H6b. 
4.1.7  Credit Rating Strength and Debt 
Regarding the credit rating strength, we observe that the results for the variable 
employed, DUMMY_CR, are the expected ones. The coefficient of CR is highly 
statistically significant for all the leverage proxies. Moreover, the relationships 
between credit worthiness and total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt are 
positive. These results are almost identical to the results in Dasilas  and 
Papaysiopoulos (2013). In simple words, financial institutions trust companies with 
high credit ratings and are willing to provide loans to them. As a result, firms with 
high credit rating strength can more easily finance their operations with debt. It is 
important to note that the coefficients are higher in the total debt and short-term 
debt regressions compared to the long-term debt. This is quite reasonable and 
consistent both with the high correlation coefficient between total debt and short-
term debt and the fact that SMEs mainly use short-term financing. 
4.1.8 Dummy Crisis 
An important task of our study is the investigation of the capital structure of SMEs 
during the global financial crunch. In order to achieve this goal, we import a crisis 
dummy variable in our econometric models. Our dummy variable (CRISIS) takes the 
value of 1 for the years 2006-2008 which is the time period before the global 
financial distress (pre-crisis period) and the value of 0 for the time period after the 
crisis, 2009-2012 (post-crisis period). The crisis dummy is combined with all the 
explanatory variables to find out if the outcomes during the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
present any differences. We figure out that size affects more total debt and long-
term debt in the pre-crisis period compared to the post-crisis period. As far as the 
asset tangibility is concerned, we observe that long-term debt is affected more in the 
pre-crisis period and short-term debt is affected more in the post-crisis period. One 
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possible explanation might be that financial institutions used to require collateral to 
approve long-term loans before crisis while after the crisis they required collateral in 
short-term loans to ensure their lending capital. The interaction of the profitability 
variable with the crisis dummy provides results that present a higher post-crisis 
influence on total debt and short-term debt. A probable reasoning according to 
(Michaelas et al.) is that small firms are more likely to choose as a source of finance a 
short-term loan that a long-term loan. This statement can be held in an era of crisis 
where companies are not willing to risk their sustainability by long-term borrowing. 
Growth Opportunities appear to increase leverage in the post-crisis period, implying 
that global financial distress made companies more reluctant to borrow in order to 
expand.  The effect of the years of firm operation is stronger for all debt proxies in 
the post-crisis era. The fact that a company operates many years in the industry is a 
sign that this company is well established. It is quite reasonable that after the crisis, 
financial institutions give more emphasis on the age parameter in order to provide 
loans. The regression results also show that liquidity affects more total debt and 
short-term debt in the post-crisis period, whereas long-term debt is more affected in 
the pre-crisis period. Finally, the effect of credit rating strength in the post-crisis era 
is positive. In other words, the creditworthiness of a firm is of greater importance 
after the crisis in determining its leverage levels. 
4.2 Country panels on capital structure determinants of SMEs 
during global financial distress 
The next step in our study is to investigate how the independent variables interact 
with all proxies of debt in each country separately during the global financial 
distress. We make an attempt to define whether we have only firm specific effects or 
the regressions outcomes are a combination of firm specific and country specific 
effects. 
[Insert Table8, Table9, Table10, Table11 and Table12 about here] 
The first variable examined is the firm size (LNSA). We have more or less the same 
results as in the regression of the generic model. Specifically in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Romania and Republic of Serbia we have a positive and statistical 
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significant coefficient in the total debt and short-term debt models.  When it comes 
to the long-term debt model, the coefficient of the size variable, as in the generic 
model, is not significant. A noteworthy finding is the insignificance of the variable at 
the regressions for all proxies of debt for the companies of Croatia. In other words, 
the firm's size in Croatia does not affect leverage at all. Bulgaria’s LNSA coefficient 
has a positive sign and it is statistical significant in the regression of total debt and 
long -term debt, while in short-term debt is positive and insignificant. We have to 
notice that the findings from Bulgaria are in line with our set of hypotheses and 
consistent with the studies of (Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013). Taking into 
consideration the pecking order theory we observe that the results of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Romania and Republic of Serbia follow it by displaying a positive and 
statistical significant coefficient. Moreover, the coefficient of firm size has a positive 
sign and is statistical significant in the regression of total debt and short-term debt 
which is in line with the studies ofBevan and Danbolt (2004), Degryse et al. (2010), 
Sogorb-Mira (2005). Thus, H1a is accepted while H1c is rejected. 
Based on our results we observe that asset tangibility (TANG), in the five countries 
under examination, does not display any difference from the output of the generic 
regression. The signs of the coefficients and the statistical significances do not 
change. This outcome is not consistent with any of our theories, either the Pecking 
order or the trade-off, which expect a positive coefficient sign at the regression of 
total debt. As far as asset tangibility is concerned, in the long-term debt and the 
short-term debt regressions of every country, it presents positive and negative 
coefficient signs, respectively. This outcome can be verified by many studies such as 
these of (Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013, Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2012) more 
specifically, (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008) state that part of the tangible assets is 
taken as collateral for long-term debt, while in short-term debt the existence of 
guarantees is not necessary. So, our hypotheses H2b, H2c are accepted and in line 
with the majority of prior studies, but H2a is rejected and the results follow the study 
of Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) who stated that tangible assets offer more security 
than current assets; Thus companies with fixed assets should issue more debt.  
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The most controversial variable in our analysis, which is expressed through ROA, is 
profitability. The outcomes of the regressions in the generic models have nothing to 
do with the outcomes of each country separately. In the generic models we observe 
a positive coefficient sign of profitability variable on the regression of total debt and 
short-term debt, while a negative coefficient sign is observed in the regression of 
long-term debt. The coefficient's statistical significance is observed only in the short-
term and long-term debt regressions. The results for the countries present a wide 
diversity, specifically in the countries of Bulgaria and Croatia the coefficients of 
profitability are not significant. This is an interesting outcome, indicating that 
companies' profits in Bulgaria and Croatia do not affect leverage; we believe that it 
needs further investigation to figure out what kind of variables affect debt in the 
these countries. On the other hand, the coefficients of ROA in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Romania, and Republic of Serbia have negative signs and they are statistically 
significant at the regressions of total debt and short-term debt; while in the 
regression of long-term debt, ROA is not significant. Our results support the pecking 
order theory according to which a negative sign on the coefficient of the profitability 
is expected. Moreover, our results are in line with those of (Bevan and Danbolt, 
2004, Degryse et al., 2010, Hall et al., 2004, Michaelas et al., 1999). Therefore, we 
accept hypotheses H3a and H3c.  
Regarding the growth proxy variable we do not have statistically significant results in 
the models of Bulgaria and Republic of Serbia, which means that growth 
opportunities is not an important determinant of capital structure of SMEs in these 
two countries. In the Bosnian & Herzegovinian model we observe a positive and 
significant relationship between growth and total debt and long-term debt and 
negative and significant relationship between growth and short-term debt. In the 
Croatian model we have positive relationship with long-term debt and negative with 
short-term debt. Finally, in the Romanian model we have negative and significant 
relationship with short-term debt. It is obvious that these results do not comply with 
those of the generic models. Finally, it should be noted that the results are not in line 
with the expected ones and in most cases the testable hypotheses are rejected. 
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Country specific parameters might have the main responsibility for the 
differentiation and the diversity of our results. 
In the case of the liquidity variable (CF), we could state that the results that occur 
from the country models, in their majority follow those of the generic models. More 
specifically, we have negative and statistically significant relationship in all five 
countries with total debt. As far as long-term debt is concerned we have positive and 
statistically significant result in the Bulgarian, Croatian and Serbian models. Also we 
have negative and statistically significant relationship of short-term debt with the 
liquidity variable in the Bulgarian, Croatian and Romanian models.  
The results derived from the separate country regressions for the years of firm 
operation are quite different from those of the regressions of the generic models. As 
it is already mentioned there is evidence that age is not an important determinant of 
capital structure at least in explaining total debt and short-term debt and provides 
results contrary to the theory in terms of long-term debt. In the five separate 
country models of our analysis we have negative and statistically significant 
relationships of age with total debt and short-term debt in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria and Croatia and statistically insignificant results for long-term debt. As a 
result it could be stated that the predictions of the pecking order theory are solid. In 
the two remaining countries, Romania and Republic of Serbia, which consist almost 
the 66% of our dataset and their results, are reflected in the generic model as well, 
we do not have statistically significant results and we could state that years of firm 
operation is not an important determinant of capital structure at all. Country specific 
effects in Republic of Serbia and Romania combined with the high participation of 
the SMEs of these two countries in the final dataset are responsible for the irrelevant 
outcomes in the analysis conducted at the generic models. 
As far as credit strength is concerned in our five separate models we have highly 
statistically significant and positive relationship with all debt proxies. This is the only 
explanatory variable that provides strictly the same results both in the generic and 
the separate models and follows the theory, allowing us to accept the hypotheses 
we set. 
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Finally, we focus on how dummy crisis variable affects our interacted variables in 
each country. By a quick glance in Table9 and Table10 we observe that global crisis 
did not really affect the SMEs in Bulgaria and Croatia. There is not a significant 
coefficient throughout all the regressions of leverage. The results of the Bosnia & 
Herzegovina regression reveal that asset tangibility and growth opportunities 
affected total debt more on the post-crisis period, while size and profitability 
affected debt in the pre-crisis period; particularly size affected long-term debt and 
profitability affected total debt and short-term debt. Also credit rating strength 
affected long-term debt more in the post-crisis period. In Romania the results are 
mixed, asset tangibility and liquidity are important in the post-crisis period in the 
short-term debt regression; while size influence the long-term debt in the post-crisis 
period and short-term debt in the pre-crisis period. The results of the regression 
concerning profitability indicate that crisis affected all proxies of debt at the pre-
crisis period. Moreover, growth opportunities affected more Romanian SMEs during 
the pre-crisis era.  Finally, in the case of Serbian SMEs we have the following results. 
LNSA seems to influence total debt and long-term debt in the pre-crisis period. A 
possible explanation might be that the larger a company the more transparent it is, 
due to robust and reliable information it provides to the external investors. This 
clarity of the information in the pre-crisis period made easier the access to credit and 
could decrease the cost of other funding sources.  Crisis seems not have affected the 
companies of Republic of Serbia's Profitability due to the absence of a significant 
coefficient for all proxies of leverage. Additionally, asset tangibility indicates 
significance in the total debt regression in the post-crisis period. The finding is the 
expected one because financial institutions require more collateral from the firms in 
distress times; they have to ensure that they will retrieve their lending capital. 
Finally, growth opportunities, age and credit rating strength influence total debt and 
long-term debt in the post-crisis period. These results are consistent with those of 
the generic and quite reasonable because they are indicative of the establishment of 
a stricter framework on the credit access. 
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5. Conclusions 
Undoubtedly, capital structure choice is one of the most important decisions 
managers should take, and it is also a complicated research area. Consequently, 
many studies attempted to tackle this issue but there is no consensus on the 
determinants of capital structure. This study contributes to this prolific academic 
area by analyzing the effect of firm factors, credit rating strength and country factors 
in the Balkans, using panel data methodology. Except from size, asset tangibility, 
profitability, growth opportunities and age, which are employed in the majority of 
prior studies, we incorporate liquidity proxy. Additionally, we take into consideration 
the effect of credit ratings on capital structure and how global financial distress 
affected the behavior of the determinants. Finally, we check whether there are 
country specific effects, by comparing the results of the generic model with the 
results of five separate country models. 
In our study, total debt is concerned as dependent debt variable; the econometric 
analysis provides statistically significant results for size, asset tangibility, growth 
opportunities, liquidity, credit ratings and all the interacted variables with dummy 
crisis except asset tangibility. The coefficient signs approve a positive relationship 
with firm size, growth opportunities and credit rating strength. On the other hand, 
asset tangibility and liquidity are negatively related with total debt. Also, dummy 
crisis coefficients suggest that all variables affect total debt more in the post-crisis 
period except size. In the long-term debt model, all coefficients are statistically 
significant except the coefficients of size and the dummy crisis interacted with 
profitability. The outcomes comply with the expected results, in the cases of size, 
growth opportunities and credit rating strength. The relationship of long-term debt 
with all the explanatory variables is positive except from profitability. Furthermore 
size, asset tangibility and liquidity affect more this debt proxy at the pre-crisis period 
and the rest of them at the post-crisis period. Just asset tangibility and credit rating 
strength have the expected relationship with long-term debt. Finally, independent 
variables of short-term debt model are significant except the age variable and the 
dummy crisis interacted with size. Short-term debt is positively related with the 
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majority of the variables and negatively related just with asset tangibility and 
liquidity. Taking into consideration crisis, only profitability affected short-term debt 
at a greater extent at the pre–crisis period. The outcomes do not comply with the 
expected findings for size, profitability and liquidity. 
Our study's next scope is to shed light on the determinants of the capital structure in 
the five countries before and after the global financial crisis. The findings in five 
countries show that asset tangibility follows the outcome of the generic regression 
to all proxies of debt. Moreover, a negative relationship between asset tangibility 
coefficient and total and short-term debt is indicated; while there is a positive 
relationship between asset tangibility and long-term debt. In the same vein the 
variables of CF and dummy CR follow the results of the generic regression. We 
observe negative and significant coefficient of CF in the regression of total and short-
term debt. At the regression of long-term debt we observe a positive and statistical 
significant coefficient. On the dummy variable CR we notice a positive and statistical 
significant coefficient to all proxies of leverage. The next variable, LNSA, under 
investigation revealed that debt in the Croatian model is not affected by size. 
Meanwhile in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Serbia size 
positively affects firms' total and short-term leverage. The most controversial 
findings come from the variable of ROA which indicates no relationship with debt in 
the countries of Bulgaria and Croatia. In addition the findings of the generic 
regression concerning profitability are irrelevant with the findings in the countries of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Romania and Republic of Serbia. Taking age into 
consideration we find out that it is not a statistically significant parameter in the 
Bulgarian and Serbian model. On the other hand, the results of the rest countries 
under examination indicate a negative and significant coefficient on the total and 
short-term debt regressions. These outputs comply with the pecking order theory; 
however they are opposed to the outputs of the generic model. In addition, growth 
opportunities variable, in Bulgaria and Republic of Serbia do not seem to relate to 
any leverage proxy. Though, in the other Balkan countries growth opportunities 
affect negatively short-term debt. Finally, all variables interacted with dummy crisis 
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provide the following results. Asset tangibility behaves in the same way before and 
after crisis in all countries except from Bulgaria and Republic of Serbia. A possible 
explanation might be that collateral was always an important parameter in loan 
decision making for financial institutions.  
Size complies with the results of our generic models. The next interacted variable, 
age, affects the Serbian total and long-term debt regressions in the post-crisis 
period; whereas in Croatia affects more total debt in the pre-crisis period. 
Profitability variable influences all proxies of debt more in the pre-crisis period. 
Specifically, total debt in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Romania, long-term debt in 
Romania and short-term debt in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Romania and Croatia, 
provide significant coefficients of ROA interacted with dummy crisis. Liquidity in the 
majority of our findings affects leverage proxies in the same extent before and after 
crisis. Growth opportunities influence more in the post-crisis period Serbian firms 
both in the total and long-term debt regressions. Bulgarian firms behave in the same 
way in the total debt regression and Croatian in the long-term debt regression. 
Credit rating strength was always an important determinant of leverage. Based on 
our findings we observe that the majority of the countries are indifferent. 
We expect that the results of this study will be a useful tool in the hands of firm 
managers in Balkans. The balance between debt and equity in a company, under the 
global financial distress we are facing, is of vital importance for a manager. Also 
policy makers might be interested in our study for improving business environment 
through investment and growth. Financial institutions could possible take advantage 
of this study to adjust their lending policy concerning Balkan SMEs. 
The limitations of the current study relate to the omission of corporate governance 
factors which are also important determinants of capital structure. Moreover a 
representative dataset could have provided more robust findings. Two countries 
consist almost 65% of the total dataset and panel data analysis is possible only in 5 
countries of the Balkan area.  Finally, suggestions for further research could be an 
industry panel analysis of our dataset and different selection of the ratios that 
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support the variables i.e. ROE instead of ROA for profitability, or annual change of 
earnings instead of INTA for growth opportunities. 
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Appendix 
Country Number of firms % of Total 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (BA) 48 13,37% 
Bulgaria (BG) 21 5,85% 
Greece (GR) 16 4,46% 
Croatia (HR) 26 7,24% 
Montenegro (ME) 3 0,84% 
Romania (RO) 76 21,17% 
Republic of Serbia (RS) 162 45,13% 
Slovenia (SI) 7 1,95% 
Balkans (Total) 359 100,00% 
Table 2 County Distribution of the SME sample 
 
Figure 1 Country Distribution of the SME sample 
Distribution of the Sample by Country 
BA
BG
GR
HR
ME
RO
RS
SI
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 DR SDR LDR AGE CF INTA LNSA TANG ROA DUMMY_CR 
           
 Mean 0,464 0,340 0,124 3,080 2,015 0,014 8,579 0,511 0,017 2,338 
 Median 0,434 0,300 0,068 2,944 1,309 0,001 8,530 0,512 0,009 2,000 
 Maximum 3,564 3,454 0,924 4,844 34,970 1,370 11,197 0,989 3,341 4,000 
 Minimum 0,012 0,012 0,000 0,000 0,033 0,000 3,211 0,000 -0,778 1,000 
 Std. Dev. 0,271 0,232 0,150 0,763 2,390 0,059 0,767 0,218 0,124 0,768 
 Skewness 1,556 2,072 1,926 -0,240 4,909 9,861 -0,524 -0,002 10,142 0,278 
 Kurtosis 13,684 19,188 7,439 3,260 42,399 162,820 8,143 2,340 256,258 2,777 
           
 Jarque-Bera 11093,990 25012,150 3094,710 26,748 147695,100 2323028,000 2468,090 39,067 5782701,000 32,157 
 Probability 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
           
 Sum 997,597 730,098 267,499 6623,051 4331,443 31,080 18445,320 1098,649 36,028 5027,000 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 157,805 116,126 48,615 1250,116 12276,810 7,383 1264,807 101,692 33,013 1267,173 
           
 Observations 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the full sample (2006-2011)  
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 DR SDR LDR AGE CF INTA LNSA TANG ROA DUMMY_CR 
           
 Mean 0,448 0,330 0,118 2,990 1,973 0,014 8,578 0,517 0,024 2,272 
 Median 0,418 0,286 0,065 2,833 1,366 0,001 8,568 0,521 0,014 2,000 
 Maximum 1,387 1,215 0,924 4,820 18,023 0,440 11,197 0,989 1,086 4,000 
 Minimum 0,018 0,018 0,000 0,000 0,033 0,000 3,211 0,000 -0,399 1,000 
 Std. Dev. 0,244 0,213 0,141 0,824 2,015 0,049 0,853 0,215 0,099 0,742 
 Skewness 0,467 0,943 1,935 -0,328 3,205 5,175 -1,052 -0,071 2,883 0,394 
 Kurtosis 2,806 3,714 7,760 3,310 16,349 32,165 9,412 2,364 32,566 3,025 
           
 Jarque-Bera 40,755 181,991 1684,143 23,512 9812,162 42857,210 2038,063 19,009 40605,050 27,855 
 Probability 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
           
 Sum 481,413 354,290 127,123 3210,739 2119,024 14,941 9212,352 554,987 26,182 244,000 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 63,878 48,569 21,452 728,261 4355,089 2,531 781,123 49,515 10,565 590,611 
           
 Observations 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 1074 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for the pre-crisis sample (2006-2008)  
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 DR SDR LDR AGE CF INTA LNSA TANG ROA DUMMY_CR 
           
 Mean 0,480 0,349 0,130 3,171 2,056 0,015 8,581 0,505 0,009 2,404 
 Median 0,445 0,314 0,069 2,996 1,270 0,001 8,494 0,501 0,005 2,000 
 Maximum 3,564 3,454 0,907 4,844 34,970 1,370 10,588 0,978 3,341 4,000 
 Minimum 0,012 0,012 0,000 1,099 0,042 0,000 6,027 0,000 -0,778 1,000 
 Std. Dev. 0,295 0,250 0,159 0,685 2,714 0,067 0,671 0,220 0,144 0,788 
 Skewness 2,103 2,708 1,888 0,083 5,376 11,134 0,599 0,067 12,047 0,158 
 Kurtosis 17,816 26,264 7,024 2,505 45,806 179,667 3,248 2,327 275,494 2,616 
           
 Jarque-Bera 10634,390 25580,010 1364,764 12,225 87331,480 1421534,000 67,093 21,117 3355027,000 11,056 
 Probability 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,004 
           
 Sum 516,184 375,808 140,376 3412,312 2212,419 16,139 9232,967 543,662 9,846 2587,000 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 93,394 67,354 27,085 504,094 7918,008 4,851 483,679 52,106 22,323 667,140 
           
 Observations 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for the post-crisis sample (2009-2011) 
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Correlation Matrix 
  DR SDR LDR AGE CF DUMMY_CR INTA LNSA ROA TANG 
DR 1,000          
SDR 0,817 1,000                 
LDR 0,497 -0,095 1,000        
AGE -0,175 -0,166 -0,053 1,000             
CF -0,522 -0,515 -0,125 0,114 1,000      
DUMMY_CR 0,526 0,431 0,259 -0,059 -0,389 1,000         
INTA 0,008 0,017 -0,012 -0,015 -0,065 0,038 1,000    
LNSA -0,031 0,029 -0,097 0,177 0,082 -0,223 -0,087 1,000     
ROA -0,147 -0,066 -0,155 -0,034 0,208 -0,580 0,003 0,064 1,000  
TANG -0,201 -0,367 0,206 0,006 -0,169 0,139 -0,145 -0,235 -0,259 1,000 
Table 6 Pearson correlation matrix for the variables employed in regressions 
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Generic Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 2150 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
Constant  0,076 -0,102 0,086 
    0,773 -1,271 0,685 
TANG  +/+/- -0,286 0,058 -0,337 
    (-10,285)*** (2,582)*** (-12,51)*** 
LNSA +/+/- 0,019 -0,002 0,034 
    (2,715)*** -0,444 (4,372)*** 
AGE -/-/- 0,045 0,049 0,017 
    1,474 (1,986)** 0,423 
ROA -/-/- 0,032 -0,169 0,204 
    0,748 (-4,825)*** (4,890)*** 
CF +/-/+ -0,016 0,009 -0,025 
    (-8,246)*** (5,686)*** (-13,105)*** 
INTA +/-/+ 0,846 0,300 0,544 
    (9,502)*** (4,139)*** (6,335)*** 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,110 0,019 0,095 
    (16,512)*** (3,542)*** (14,315)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? -0,022 0,032 -0,079 
    -0,973 (1,757)* (-3,423)*** 
CRISIS*LNSA ? 0,031 0,010 0,005 
    (8,446)*** (3,230)*** 0,660 
CRISIS*AGE ? -0,033 -0,022 -0,016 
    (-4,168)*** (-3,386)*** (-1,780)** 
CRISIS*ROA ? -0,167 0,056 -0,263 
    (-3,056)*** 1,263 (-4,825)*** 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,005 0,005 -0,011 
    (-1,989)** (2,450)** (-4,615)*** 
CRISIS*INTA ? -0,718 -0,167 -0,579 
    (-7,455)*** (-2,131)** (-6,197)*** 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? -0,060 -0,017 -0,053 
    (-7,983)*** (-2,773)*** (-6,542)*** 
Table 7 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: total sample.
8
 
 
                                                          
8
 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. 
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Bosnia & Herzegovina (BA)  Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 288 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
C  0,044 -0,210 0,212 
    0,320 (-1,86139)* (1,7701)* 
TANG  +/+/- -0,195 0,161 -0,366 
    (-3,700)*** (3,651)*** (-7,571)*** 
LNSA +/+/- 0,062 0,010 0,055 
    (4,097)*** 0,829 (4,055)*** 
AGE -/-/- -0,057 0,011 -0,066 
    (-2,502)** 0,649 (-3,883)*** 
ROA -/-/- -0,300 0,057 -0,275 
    (-1,849)* 0,414 (-1,772)* 
CF +/-/+ -0,041 -0,004 -0,043 
    (-8,824)*** -0,893 (-9,754)*** 
INTA +/-/+ 0,168 0,400 -0,268 
    (1,791)* (5,046)*** (-3,012)*** 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,095 0,044 0,062 
    (7,125)*** (3,834)*** (4,818)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? -0,076 -0,006 -0,063 
    (-1,683)* -0,165 -1,430 
CRISIS*LNSA ? 0,010 0,014 -0,004 
    1,368 (2,203)** -0,604 
CRISIS*AGE ? 0,002 -0,004 0,007 
    0,208 -0,420 0,618 
CRISIS*ROA ? 0,333 -0,247 0,526 
    (1,752)* -1,520 (2,829)*** 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,003 -0,001 -0,003 
    -0,606 -0,204 -0,521 
CRISIS*INTA ? -0,224 -0,087 -0,110 
    (-1,796)* -0,813 -0,908 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? -0,017 -0,041 0,024 
    -1,058 (-2,951)*** 1,514 
Table 8 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: sample of Bosnia & Herzegovina
9
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 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 Determinants of the Capital  
Structure of SME’s in Balkans 
 
41 | P a g e  
 
Bulgaria (BG)  Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 126 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
C  -0,303 -0,695 0,525 
    (-1,927)* (-4,962)*** (3,463)*** 
TANG  +/+/- -0,175 0,309 -0,498 
    (-2,547)** (5,052)*** (-7,531)*** 
LNSA +/+/- 0,088 0,068 0,008 
    (5,309)*** (4,616)*** 0,510 
AGE -/-/- -0,056 -0,020 -0,041 
    (-3,369)*** -1,319 (-2,495)** 
ROA -/-/- 0,223 -0,052 0,225 
    1,427 -0,388 1,586 
CF +/-/+ -0,038 0,022 -0,055 
    (-4,286)*** (2,838)*** (-6,716)*** 
INTA +/-/+ 0,580 0,335 0,286 
    0,858 0,558 0,439 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,150 0,051 0,091 
    (6,052)*** (2,395)** (4,048)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? -0,064 -0,008 -0,054 
    -0,715 -0,097 -0,669 
CRISIS*LNSA ? 0,002 0,011 -0,007 
    0,175 0,987 -0,609 
CRISIS*AGE ? 0,000 -0,020 0,022 
    0,001 -1,237 1,291 
CRISIS*ROA ? 0,500 0,435 0,028 
    1,534 1,543 0,095 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,012 -0,001 -0,013 
    -1,030 -0,093 -1,133 
CRISIS*INTA ? -0,907 -0,378 -0,418 
    -1,110 -0,537 -0,563 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? 0,031 -0,009 0,032 
    0,868 -0,294 0,985 
Table 9 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: sample of Bulgaria
10
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 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Croatia  (HR)  Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 152 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
C  0,654 0,265 0,216 
    (3,533)*** 1,236 1,307 
TANG  +/+/- -0,343 -0,009 -0,304 
    (-4,120)*** -0,093 (-4,342)*** 
LNSA +/+/- -0,001 -0,017 0,029 
    -0,060 -0,744 1,490 
AGE -/-/- -0,084 -0,046 -0,054 
    (-2,752)*** -1,273 (-2,362)** 
ROA -/-/- -0,107 0,183 -0,239 
    -0,363 0,544 -0,797 
CF +/-/+ -0,023 0,026 -0,045 
    (-2,784)*** (2,680)*** (-5,660)*** 
INTA +/-/+ 1,254 3,494 -3,850 
    0,875 (2,115)** (-2,937)*** 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,137 0,073 0,100 
    (5,694)*** (2,645)*** (4,313)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? 0,047 0,088 -0,025 
    0,724 1,185 -0,361 
CRISIS*LNSA ? -0,008 -0,007 -0,005 
    -0,713 -0,531 -0,472 
CRISIS*AGE ? 0,046 0,033 0,018 
    (2,566)** 1,599 1,033 
CRISIS*ROA ? 0,288 -0,290 0,609 
    0,814 -0,716 (1,670)* 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,005 0,003 -0,007 
    -0,668 0,277 -0,791 
CRISIS*INTA ? 0,581 -3,907 5,108 
    0,519 (-3,059)*** (4,450)*** 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? -0,038 -0,030 -0,005 
    -1,613 -1,141 -0,207 
Table 10 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: sample of Croatia
11
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 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Romania (RO)  Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 456 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
C  0,129 -0,007 0,212 
    0,891 -0,063 (1,780)* 
TANG  +/+/- -0,257 0,188 -0,445 
    (-4,777)*** (4,298)*** (-9,600)*** 
LNSA +/+/- 0,043 0,003 0,035 
    (3,104)*** 0,284 (2,875)*** 
AGE -/-/- -0,012 -0,014 -0,014 
    -0,248 -0,362 -0,358 
ROA -/-/- -1,037 -0,203 -0,858 
    (-7,175)*** -0,687 (-6,498)*** 
CF +/-/+ -0,017 0,002 -0,019 
    (-5,765)*** 0,986 (-7,636)*** 
INTA +/-/+ -0,883 0,385 -1,291 
    -1,608 0,842 (-2,584)*** 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,076 0,018 0,064 
    (5,149)*** 1,480 (4,776)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? -0,059 0,031 -0,092 
    -1,161 0,737 (-1,965)** 
CRISIS*LNSA ? 0,006 -0,015 0,019 
    0,595 (-1,743)* (2,063)** 
CRISIS*AGE ? -0,005 0,018 -0,018 
    -0,155 0,704 -0,650 
CRISIS*ROA ? 0,879 0,248 0,658 
    (4,906)*** (1,656)* (3,999)*** 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,013 0,006 -0,020 
    (-3,171)*** 1,571 (-5,074)*** 
CRISIS*INTA ? 2,734 1,529 1,189 
    (2,803)*** (1,877)* 1,332 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? 0,000 0,017 -0,015 
    0,020 1,109 -0,880 
Table 11 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: sample of Romania
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 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Republic of Serbia  (RS)  Regression Outputs  
Number of 
observations: 972 
Expected 
Outcome 
DR LDR SDR 
C  0,214 0,045 0,174 
    (2,716)*** 0,642 (2,198)** 
TANG  +/+/- -0,309 0,032 -0,333 
    (-9,3316)*** 1,064 (-9,963)*** 
LNSA +/+/- 0,032 -0,004 0,034 
    (3,936)*** -0,575 (4,157)*** 
AGE -/-/- -0,006 0,002 -0,010 
    -0,474 0,190 -0,765 
ROA -/-/- -0,336 -0,127 -0,178 
    (-4,183)*** (-1,704)* (-2,151)** 
CF +/-/+ -0,020 0,007 -0,028 
    (-8,265)*** (3,154)*** -1,142 
INTA +/-/+ 0,179 0,240 -0,119 
    0,758 1,130 -0,500 
DUMMY_CR +/+/+ 0,091 0,029 0,068 
    (9,937)*** (3,432)*** (7,236)*** 
CRISIS*TANG ? -0,056 -0,029 -0,031 
    (-1,743)* -0,982 -0,952 
CRISIS*LNSA ? 0,023 0,017 0,006 
    (4,448)*** (3,645)*** 1,168 
CRISIS*AGE ? -0,031 -0,025 -0,006 
    (-3,508)*** (-3,024)*** -0,600 
CRISIS*ROA ? -0,004 -0,104 0,074 
    -0,040 -1,092 0,698 
CRISIS*CF ? -0,004 0,004 -0,009 
    -1,420 1,323 (-2,797)*** 
CRISIS*INTA ? -0,565 -0,431 -0,142 
    (-2,516)** (-2,063)** -0,612 
CRISIS*DUMMY_CR ? -0,038 -0,029 -0,011 
    (-3,462)*** (-2,814)*** -0,967 
Table 12 Regression output for total, long-term and short-term leverage: sample of Republic of Serbia
13
 
 
                                                          
13
 Notes: The dependent variables are (a) the debt ratio which is defined as the total debt to total assets, (b) the 
long-term debt which is defined as the long-term debt to total assets, (c) the short-term debt which is defined as 
the short-term debt to total assets. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (LNSA) is 
the natural logarithm of sales. Age (AGE) is the natural logarithm of years in operation. Profitability (ROA) is the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity (CF) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Growth 
opportunities (INTA) is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Credit rating strength (DUMMY_CR) is taking 
the value of 1 for firms with a credit rating between AAA and A (highly-rated), 2 for firms with a credit rating 
between BBB and BB, 3 for firms with a credit rating between B and CCC, and 4 for firms with a credit rating 
between CC and D (low-rated. CRISIS is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the post-crisis period (2009-2011). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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